




of States and Governments
Traditionally, the courts of the United Kingdom have been reluctant to
accept the validity of legislative, executive, and judicial acts of foreign
states or governments that are not recognized as such by the United
Kingdom. ' The rationale behind this substantive rule, which also extends
to a denial of locus standi,2 is that it is the duty of the judiciary not to
compromise the executive in matters of foreign policy by accepting the
validity of acts of a body from which Her Majesty's Government has
withheld diplomatic recognition. In order not to impair the proper conduct
of foreign affairs, the executive and the judiciary must speak with "one
voice." 3 Therefore, the opinion of the UK Government as to whether a
particular body or group "exists" as a state or government is conclusive.
4
This process then determines, as a necessary consequence, whether leg-
*Lecturer in Law, Trinity College, Oxford.
I. Luthor v. Sagor, [1921] I K.B. 456; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. [1967]
I App. Cas. 853, 958.
2. City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. Jun. 347 (1804).
3. The Arantzazu Mendi, S.S. v. Government of the Republic of Spain, [1931] App. Cas.
256, 264 (per Lord Atkin); see also Wilmshurst, Executive Certificates in Foreign Affairs:
The United Kingdom. 35 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 157 (1986).
4. Carl Zeiss, at 901. Luthor v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 548. See also Warbrick, Executive
Certificates in Foreign Affairs: Prospects for Review and Control, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
138 (1986).
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islative and administrative acts are to be respected in matters arising
before the courts of the United Kingdom. 5
In recent years, however, the United Kingdom has made certain re-
finements-if not strictly exceptions 6 -both to this rule and to UK prac-
tice. As to the rule itself, the House of Lords in Carl Ziess Stiftung v.
Rayner & Keeler7 decided that legislative and executive acts of the "Ger-
man Democratic Republic"--then unrecognized by the United Kingdom 8 -
were to be regarded as valid for the purposes of an action commenced in
the High Court. British courts were instructed to take cognizance of acts
flowing from the authorities in this territory as acts of delegated legislation,
duly authorized by the USSR. 9 The latter, according to the Foreign Office
certificate requested by the court, was "de jure entitled to exercise gov-
erning authority in respect of that zone." ° In other words, even though
the United Kingdom did not recognize either the state or government of
the "German Democratic Republic," its legislation was deemed effective
under the imprimatur of a recognized sovereign state. Evidence that, in
fact, the USSR exercised no control or authority in this territory was
inadmissible because it was contrary to the terms of the Foreign Office
statement. I I
Furthermore, in 1980, the UK Government announced that it would
no longer issue certificates indicating formal recognition of governments
of foreign states. 12 In future, the question whether a regime qualified, in
the eyes of the United Kingdom, as a government, "will be left to be
inferred from the nature of the dealings, if any, which [the UK Govern-
ment] may have with it, and in particular on whether [the UK Government]
are dealing with it on a normal Government to Government basis." 13
The effect of this change in practice is of the first importance. In future
cases, whether recognition will be accorded to the legislative and admin-
5. The court has taken this view even though the certificate or Foreign Office letter may
state that it is for the court to determine the consequences which follow. See, e.g., The
Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] App. Cas. at 256.
6. This was the view of Master of the Rolls Donaldson in Gur Corporation v. Trust Bank
of South Africa, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 583, 599. The "application in unusual circumstances" of
the rule declaring the invalidity of acts of an unrecognized state results, in fact, however,
in the court treating those acts as if they were valid.
7. [1967] App. Cas. 853.
8. The German Democratic Republic was recognized by the United Kingdom in 1973
when that state, along with the Federal Republic, was admitted to the United Nations.
9. Carl Zeiss, I App. Cas. at 904 (per Lord Reid, with whom Lords Hodson, Guest, and
Upjohn agreed). See Lord Wilberforce at 958.
10. Id. at 859. The letter was dated Nov. 6, 1964.
I. Id. at 901, 957.
12. Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Apr. 28,
1980 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1121-22 [hereinafter Statement]; see also Symmons, [1981]
P.L. 248.
13. 985 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 385 (1980) [hereinafter Written Answer].
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istrative acts of a body alleged to be a "sovereign government" will be
more a matter of evidence and interpretation for the court and less a
matter of executive direction. 14 In the absence of authoritative guidance,
however, there was some uncertainty as to how the court's interpretation
would, in fact, affect the operation of the traditional rule concerning the
consequences of nonrecognition.
In the recent case of Gur Corporation v. Trust Bank of South Africa 15
the Court of Appeal faced this issue when considering the locus standi
of the "Republic of Ciskei." 16 The material issue before the court was
whether Gur Corporation or the Department of Public Works of the State
of Ciskei were entitled to monies deposited with Trust Bank by way of
guarantee under a construction contract between the department and the
corporation. All three parties agreed that it was essential that Ciskei be
joined to the proceedings. When this was attempted at first instance,
however, Mr. Justice Steyn, 17 of his own motion, raised the preliminary
question of locus standi.18 Accordingly, a letter was directed to the For-
eign Office in the following terms: "What recognition, if any, does Her
Majesty's Government accord to (1) the 'Government of the Republic of
Ciskei' and/or (2) the 'Department of Public Works, Republic of Ciskei'?"
In reply, the Foreign Office certified that the UK did not recognize "de
jure or de factor [the] Republic of Ciskei." With regard to governments,
however, and consistently with the new UK practice, the Foreign Office
stated that "the attitude of Her Majesty's Government is to be inferred
from the nature of its dealings with the regime concerned and in particular
whether [the UK] deals with it on a normal government to government
basis," and further, that Her Majesty's Government "does not have any
dealings with the 'Government of the Republic of Ciskei' or the 'De-
partment of Public Works, Republic of Ciskei.' -19 In the light of these
14. This practice, founded upon the Estrada Doctrine, has been adopted by several states.
In the United Kingdom certificates will still be issued when the recognition of a state, as
opposed to a government, is in issue. In the Carl Zeiss and Gur Corporation cases, the
court was concerned with questions of statehood and "governing authority." In both cases,
the court took the view that to deny statehood did not necessarily mean there was no
sovereign government or "governing authority" over the territories. It was rather, that the
ostensible authorities could not be so characterized in the light of Foreign Office statements
about statehood.
15. [1986] 3 W.L.R. 583.
16. This territory is one of the black homelands granted independence by the South
African government in pursuance of its policy of apartheid. See also Transkei, Venda,
Bophuthatswana.
17. Mr. Justice Steyn was originally a member of the South African Bar before his suc-
cessful migration to the United Kingdom.
18. This practice was specifically approved of in Gur Corporation, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at
595.
19. Id. at 588; see supra note 13.
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answers, the Foreign Office stated that it was for the court to determine
the locus standi of Ciskei. 20 Nevertheless, with an eye, as it seems, on
the decision in Carl Zeiss, a second letter was sent by Trust Bank's
solicitors inquiring, "Which State, if any, does Her Majesty's Government
recognize as (a) entitled to exercise or (b) exercising, governing authority
in respect of the territory in Southern Africa known as Ciskei. Has such
recognition been de jure or de facto?"
In its second reply, the Foreign Office repeated that it was not current
practice to accord recognition to governments, and that, consequently,
the United Kingdom "has not taken and does not have a formal position
as regards the exercise of governing authority over the territory of Ciskei."
At the same time, while confirming that the United Kingdom had no
dealings with either the "Department of Public Works" or "Government"
of Ciskei, the Foreign Office informed the court that representations had
been made to the South African Government in relation to certain matters
affecting the territory, but that these representations had generally re-
ceived no response. 2 1
In deciding that "Ciskei" had no locus standi, Mr. Justice Steyn noted,
quite rightly, that the basis for their Lordships' decision in Carl Zeiss was
that the USSR had been expressly recognized "as de jure entitled to
exercise governing authority." 22 Given no such recognition of South Af-
rican entitlement over Ciskei in this case, nor any likelihood thereof in
view of the change in UK practice, the question of "governing authority"
was left to be determined on other evidence. This evidence, notably the
Status of Ciskei Act, 2 3 in fact established that South Africa did not claim
to be entitled to exercise governing authority over Ciskei. Furthermore,
such evidence was admissible as it did not conflict with the Foreign Office
letters, which did not address this point. On this evidence, Mr. Justice
Steyn held that the "Government of the Republic of Ciskei" had no locus
standi-it was neither a recognized government nor under the governing
authority of a recognized government.
20. The Foreign Office reply is consistent with the 1980 practice statement in that it
supplies information concerning the dealings that the United Kingdom has with the alleged
government. On a strict interpretation, however, the Foreign Office need not have refused
specific information concerning the alleged government of Ciskei. This was not a case where
"a new regime comes to power unconstitutionally," Written Answer, supra note 3, or of
"an unconstitutional change of regime .. . in a recognized state," Statement, supra note
12. Indeed, different considerations may apply to a constitutionally valid transfer of sov-
ereignty, as in the Gur case, than to the unconstitutional transfers envisaged by the 1980
practice statement.
21. Gur Corporation, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 588.
22. Id. at 590; see also infra note 33.
23. Status of Ciskei Act 1981. South African legislation granting full independence to the
territory of Ciskei.
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The matter did not rest there. On appeal by the Trust Bank and Ciskei,
the Court of Appeal reversed Mr. Justice Steyn24 and held that the Gov-
ernment of Ciskei had locus standi as a subordinate body set up by the
Republic of South Africa to act on its behalf. The court found the case
indistinguishable from Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler.
The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Donaldson, noted that the court was
precluded by the Foreign Office statements from finding that the "state"
or "government" of Ciskei was an independent sovereign. Therefore, the
only question the court faced involved whether the authorities in Ciskei
were established and enabled by a superior sovereign, recognized as such
by the United Kingdom. 25 In this case, unlike Carl Zeiss, there was no
express statement concerning entitlement to exercise governing authority,
and so the court would turn to other evidence. Moreover, the fact that
the UK Government "does not have a formal position as regards the
exercise of governing authority over the territory of Ciskei" would not
preclude the court from deciding that South Africa was entitled to exercise
this authority. The issue was not as to actual exercise of authority but as
to entitlement to do so. 26 Master of the Rolls Donaldson then looked to
the Status of Ciskei Act, but unlike Mr. Justice Steyn, he disregarded any
declarations therein confirming the independence of Ciskei as this would,
he thought, conflict with the Foreign Office letters. Ignoring the "inde-
pendence" sections of this Act, it became a "straightforward delegation
of power which could be revoked in the same way as it had been con-
ferred. ' 27 Ciskei could be a party to legal proceedings in its own name,
being a subordinate body established by a recognized sovereign state.
In the result then, the court's interpretation of the Status of Ciskei Act
gave it a meaning in direct contradiction to that which South Africa in-
tended it to bear. Yet, to rewrite the legislation of a foreign sovereign
state in this way is itself contrary to the principles that the court was
purporting to apply: principles that demand that the legislative acts of a
recognized sovereign state shall not be impugned in the courts of the
United Kingdom. 28 Moreover, the court's action was not done in order
to deny the locus standi of Ciskei in conformity with the United Kingdom's
international obligations, but rather to avoid the consequences of non-
recognition and to facilitate the appearance of that body before a domestic
tribunal.
24. Gur Corporation, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 594.
25. Id. at 601-02.
26. Id; see infra note 34.
27. Gur Corporation, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 601-02.
28. According to the principle of state immunity, the governmental acts of a foreign
sovereign may not be challenged in United Kingdom courts without its consent. See United
Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978.
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The Court of Appeal's approach is all the more surprising given that
they could have achieved the same result without any manipulation of the
"superior" sovereign's legislative acts. The judgment of Lord Justice
Nourse hints at this result. He regards the Foreign Office letters as con-
clusive without need to resort to a reinterpretation of South African leg-
islation. 29 That the United Kingdom had made representations to South
Africa concerning certain matters in Ciskei was enough to infer that Her
Majesty's Government recognized South Africa as de jure entitled to
exercise governing authority in the territory.30
Indeed, such an approach is entirely consistent with the UK practice
statement of 1980. Surprisingly, therefore, neither of the reported judg-
ments registers this fact. 31 It is precisely because the United Kingdom
no longer formally recognizes governments, that British courts may infer
South African sovereignty from the dealings that Her Majesty's Govern-
ment has with that country. Paradoxically, Lord Justice Nourse, ignoring
the repeated emphasis of the Foreign Office replies, doubts whether the
change in practice does preclude an answer to these questions. 32 Fur-
thermore, like Master of the Rolls Donaldson, he draws the unhelpful
distinction between "entitlement to exercise" and "actual exercise" of
governing authority in order to explain the relevance, or rather irrele-
vance, of the fact that the UK Government has no formal position in this
regard with respect to the territory of Ciskei. 33 Yet, the lack of a formal
position regarding Ciskei must necessarily be the case in light of the change
in UK practice. Clearly from the Foreign Office letters, it was as a result
of this change-and not because of any supposed distinction-that the
United Kingdom had no formal position. 34 If the court had paid due regard
to the change in UK practice, the decision in Gur could have been reached
29. He does, however, express his agreement with the judgment of Master of the Rolls
Donaldson. Lord Justice Glidwell agrees with both.
30. Gur Corporation, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 604.
31. Master of the Rolls Donaldson did recite the 1980 Statement in full in explanation of
the Foreign Office replies. However, he does not acknowledge that this influenced his
decision in any way. Id. at 598.
32. He regarded the issue as one recognition of a state. The amicus curiae, provided by
the Foreign Office, had reservations on this point. Id. at 603. He may also have realized
that this case did not directly fall within the ambit of the 1980 statement. See supra note
20.
33. 3 W.L.R. at 604.
34. In the Carl Zeiss case, Lord Reid rejected any distinction between dejure recognition
(entitlement to exercise) and de facto recognition (actual exercise of governing authority)
except in those cases where the new government have usurped power against the will of
the de jure sovereign. [1967] I App. Cas. 853, 906. Such is not the case with the Ciskei
authorities. Id. at 957-58 (Lord Wilberforce). In Gur Corporation, the Foreign Office replies
could have been interpreted with reference to the 1980 practice statement, as was intended,
thus achieving the same result by simpler and surer reasoning. [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 588.
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sold on the ground South Africa was de jure entitled to exercise gov-
erning authority in Ciskei as inferred from the nature of Her Majesty's
Government's dealings in respect of that territory.35 To adopt this line of
reasoning would at least have the merit of avoiding illusory distinctions
and explicit absurdity.
However, even this reasoning does not alleviate the underlying problem
facing United Kingdom courts: the inconvenient and unnecessary con-
sequences that flow from current legal doctrine on nonrecognition. Re-
sorting to legal fictions of the Carl Zeiss variety makes a mockery of the
"one voice" principle, for the court thereby allows to be done covertly
that which cannot be done openly. Moreover, while expediency may be
invoked to justify the back door admission of the laws and decrees of an
unrecognized state or government, employing the same device to grant
locus standi is an entirely different matter. By allowing the unrecognized
body to be a party to legal proceedings in its own name, the court openly
flouts the "one voice" principle and all that it is intended to achieve. 36
For this reason alone, the Court of Appeal should have upheld Mr. Justice
Steyn.
In the Carl Zeiss case Lord Wilberforce suggested a solution that might
ensure the supremacy of national policy, but not at the total expense of
private rights. 37 When private rights or acts of perfunctory administration
are concerned (there being no considerations of public policy to the
contrary38), courts might give effect to the acts of an unrecognized yet
effective government. On the facts of this case, such a development would
not assist Ciskei, yet Master of the Rolls Donaldson could
see great force in this reservation, since it is one thing to treat a state or
government as being "without the law," but quite another to treat the inhabitants
of its territory as "outlaws" who cannot effectively marry, beget legitimate
children, purchase goods on credit or undertake countless day-to-day activities
having legal consequences.
39
In the light of these and other similar dicta, 40 it is to be hoped that such
a course will be adopted in an appropriate case. The deregulation of
35. On this view, the essential difference between Gur Corporation and Carl Zeiss is the
change in United Kingdom practice.
36. That is, a uniformity in foreign affairs, a matter within the prerogative of the Crown.
37. There is some evidence to suggest that the decision in Carl Zeiss was not in accordance
with the United Kingdom's Government's view of the state of East Germany. On April 4,
1967, the responsible Minister indicated that East German passports were not acceptable
as they emanated from an unrecognized regime. 744 PARL. DEB. H.C. Written Answers 19
(5th ser.) (1967).
38. All acts of the Rhodesian authorities, after the illegal declaration of independence,
could have been held null and void on this ground. See also Adams v. Adams [1971] P. 188.
39. Gur Corporation, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 601.
40. Carl Zeiss, I App. Cas. at 907 (per Lord Reid), 941 per Lord Upjohn. Hesperides
Hotel, Ltd. v. Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd., [1978] Q.B. 205 (per Lord Denning). For other
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recognition forced by the change in UK practice may well facilitate this
development, but only if the courts are prepared to "infer" 4 1 recognition
in doubtful cases. A better solution would involve severing, once and for
all, the link between recognition and invalidity in the class of cases iden-
tified by Lord Wilberforce.
The real irony is that even if the above approach had been adopted by
the Court of Appeal, it would not have aided Ciskei on the facts of this
recent case. If ever there was a situation where the full rigor of the
nonrecognition rule was justified, in terms of legal principle and of political
necessity, surely Gur Corporation v. Trust Bank of South Africa was such
a case.
For the moment, UK courts are clearly unsure in their application of
the UK's new practice in regard to the recognition of foreign governments.
They are willing to avoid the consequences of nonrecognition where they
feel it appropriate to do so. Yet while this may be tolerable in the short
term for certain types of cases, the extension of British practice favored
by the Court of Appeal in Gur Corporation v. Trust Bank of South Africa,
and the reasoning employed to get there, are not welcomed.
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areas where the consequences of nonrecognition have been bypassed, see Re Al-Fin Cor-
poration's Patent, [1970] Ch. 160, and Reel v. Holder, [1981] I W.L.R. 1226.
41. This would require the court to receive additional evidence concerning the actual
effectiveness of an unrecognized regime upon which to base their own assessment.
